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ABSTRACT (The new Logic of Ramon Llull) 
This paper proposes a reassesment of Ramon Llullos thought in the history of 
philosophy. A previous reconsideration of the history of medieval thought is 
required. The author refuses a finalist interpretation of the Christian thought 
that reduces the ~rationalistn slant of Ansel~n and the Victorines to a 
philosophical moment overpassed, even buried, by Thomist criticisms. 
Therefore, he recognizes in the Anselmian stream a philosophical tradition of 
its own, historically transcending the Middle Ages and becoming one of the 
principal sources of Renaissance metaphysics. By reeenacting and 
transforming the terms of that current, R. Llull became one of its most decisive 
components. 
1. Ramon Llull and the History of Christian Philosophy 
In our histories of medieval thought we have concentrated on the history of 
Christian philosophy during the centuries which separated Augustine from 
Luther. Because Christian philosophy was meant to provide the praeambula to 
the acceptance of revelation, we have attended prirnarily to the history of 
rnetaphysics, ethics, and rational psychology. We have focused, above all, on 
the philosophical developments in Paris and Oxford which were so closely 
related to the evolution of Scholastic theology. As a result, we have failed to 
recognize  sorne of the greatest  achievernents of medieval  sc ience  
-achievements in rnathematics and natural philosophy, in the theory of the 
state and in the theory of what science itself is. Our paradigm has forced us to 
regard what is known as Averroism as an aberration and the fourteenth century 
as the end of a joumey. We have no organic place in our histories for figures 
like the Englishman Roger Bacon, the Italian Pietro d'Abano, and the Catalan 
Arnau de Vilanova and even for such significant personalities as Dante 
Alighieri and Nicolaus Cusanus. In this essay 1 would like to outline the 
philosophical contribution of an author who has suffered much from the narrow 
scope of our current account: the Majorcan Ramon Llull. 
Around the beginning of the twelfth century in the temtories bordering on 
Islam -in Catalonia and in the kingdorns of Toledo and Sicily- there 
appeared a conception of knowledge and reality which opened a new period in 
the history of thought. The commerce and trade which flourished in the 
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Mediterranean basin formed its material basis, the spirit which animated it was 
a rare spint of openness and tolerance which was bom of the contact between 
the three great civilisations of Islam, Judaism and Christianity. 
In Toledo Christians and Jews labored together to make available to the 
Latin West the Greek philosophy and science which had been transmitted in 
Arabic. Frederick 11 of Sicily corresponded with Moslem philosophers in the 
search for solutions to problems arising out of the confrontation between pagan 
science and the Christian tradition. In the territory of Barcelona and on the 
Catalan coast of southem France Jewish scholars expelled from Moslem Spain 
by the intolerance of the Almohade monarchs translated Arabic works into 
Hebrew, Hebrew and Arabic works into Latin,  and even Latin works 
into Hebrew. 
One of the most remarkable figures in this interchange was that of the 
Majorcan Ramon Llull. The island of Majorca was not only a centre of 
commercial intercourse in the Mediterranean world, but also a point where 
Islam, Judaism and Christianity met. Even after the Reconquista, Moslems 
made up a good part of the population of the island. Llull was born in 1232, 
some years after James the Conqueror retook Majorca from the Saracens. He 
died in 1316 on a ship which was bringing hirn home from his last voyage to 
North Africa, after he had -according to the local tradition- been stoned 
almost to death while preaching the Christian faith. 
This vir phantasticus -who clothed himself as a pilgrim and probably 
spoke Arabic better than Latin-, sought tirelessly in Europe, North Africa and 
the Near East to win over the powerful of his time to the cause of understanding 
and concord between peoples. Conscious of the fact that he stood at the frontier 
between the three great religions, he sought -as an arabicus christianus- to 
use methods proper to the Arabic tradition to convince Moslems and Jews of the 
truth of Christianity. 
In the pursuit of this goal, Llull's life became one of incredible literary 
production. In spite of his preaching, teaching and restless travel, Llull wrote 
some 280 works, many of them very extensive. In accordance with his 
purpose, these works were composed not only in Latin, but a also in Catalan 
and Arabic. Although the ideas in them show a rapid development, his goal 
remained always the same. He wanted to write a book which would make 
Christian doctrines intelligible to Moslems and Jews. He called his book the Ars 
inijeniendi i~eritatem, the Art of Finding the Truth, and, regarding it as a task 
imposed by God himself, worked unflaggingly on the composition of this Art 
for more than thirty years. 
His energy was not limited, however, to composing works directly 
concerned with his Art. He wrote in Latin on philosophy and theology, on logic 
and natural science, and composed in Catalan a great many popular, didactic 
works in al1 sorts of literary forms. As procurator irzfidelium he directed 
petitions to popes and cardinals and sketched in severa1 tracts a plan for the 
crusade. 
In his efforts to bring Moslems, Jews and Christians together, Llull was not 
only active as an author. He also struggled for the establishment of a new type 
The tiew Logic of Ramon Llull Enrahonar 18. 1992 125  
of educational institution, different from the Latin universities of Paris and 
Oxford, in which a true dialogue between the three great mediterranean 
civilisations might be possible. In repeated petitions to popes and kings he 
pleaded for the foundation of colleges in which men prepared to die for their 
faith might learn the languages and doctrine necessary for preaching to Saracens 
and Jews. 
Although he was and remained a layman, Llull decided to dedicate his life 
to a missionary apostolate. To this end he planned at first to go to Paris to leam 
Latin and scholastic theology. He was advised, however, by Ramon de 
Penyafort -the same superior of the Dominican Order whose inspiration stood 
behind the Contra gentiles of Thomas Aquinas- to return to his native 
Majorca, where he could leam not only Latin but also Arabic and something of 
Moslem thought. 
Llull not only mastered the Arabic language, but also conceived the idea of 
a new science which would serve high missionary purpose. This new science 
was based on both Latin and Arabic models. But because it was addressed to 
peoples of al1 faiths, it was not to be specifically theological, but rather a 
general science which could be applied to al1 the particular sciences of the time. 
Llull changed, therefore, the name of his Ars inveiziendi veritatem to Ars 
generalis and submitted the work to constant revision throughout his long life. 
2. Ramon Llull: Arabicus Christianus 
Toward the end of the eleventh century the increasing contacts between the 
three great Mediterranean civilizations gave birth in the Latin West to a 
fundamentally new conception of knowledge and nature. This new conception 
took different forms in different pIaces and in different thinkers, but it was 
characterized, above all, by its dynamic understanding of reality. Impressed by 
the superiority of Islamic science, Western thinkers made an enormous effort 
not only to appropriate the results of Greek and Arabic leaming, but also to 
develop a standpoint which would enable the Latins to appear as an equal 
partner in philosophical and theological discussion. This standpoint they found 
in the view that al1 reality tended actively toward the infinite. The id quo maius 
cogitari nequit of Anselm of Canterbury is but one aspect of this new vision. 
Fundamentally, the Platonism of the twelfth-century school of Chartres, the 
understanding of the artes nlechanicae as aiming at the transformation of 
reality, the thirteenth-century science of optics, the linguistic and mathematical 
analysis of questions of continuity and the infinite, the fourteenth-century 
notion of the latrtudo formarum, Albertist epistemology, the questioning of the 
geocentric hypothesis, and the new conceptions of science itself which appeared 
during the fifteenth century are al1 aspects of the same vision -aspects which 
have been consistently ignored in our histories of Christian philosophy. 
Behind the general science which Llull thought of as applicable to al1 the 
sciences there lay the fundamental vision of a natural theology which should 
approach the true God through a method of contemplation. on the divine names. 
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Llull called these names «dignities» or «axioms» and listed in the final form of 
the art nine of them: goodness, greatness, eternity; power, wisdom, love; virtue, 
truth and glory. 
His idea seems to have been based on an Islamic method of contemplation 
which attempted to ascend by way of created reflections of the divine 
perfections to the infinite perfection which is God himself. He tliought that 
through contemplation on combinations of these names, which are common to 
al1 religions, agreement could be reached between Mosle~ns and Jews, Greek 
and Latin Christians. 
One recognises the Neoplatonic axiom, Bonunz est diffusiivun~ sui, behind 
«goodness» as the first of the dignities. 'The second group of three div' 'ine names 
was possibly suggested by the Latin triad of yotestas, sapientiu, benigtzirus, 
common in the twelfth century. The inclusion of «greatness» ainong the 
principles shows very clearly however that Llull has gone beyond the static 
categories of ancient Neoplatonism and made Anselm of Canterbury's id quo 
maius cogituri nequit his point of departure. 
Llull's inspiration for the way in which these names are to be understood 
seems at the same time to have been influenced by Islamic mystical writers. He 
composed a Liber de centunz nominibus Dei in which he tells us that the 
Moslems believe that God has placed even more power in his names than in 
animals, plants and precious stones. His method of contemplation can therefore 
only be understood correctly if we take the dignities to stand for active powers. 
He insisted that we must refer al1 the powers which they designate to the 
supreme power of God, who created al1 things. 
Accordingly, Llull developed his method of contemplation not only by 
spelling out -honzontally, so to speak- nine different names of God, but also 
by making explicit -vertically- three degrees of the powers of the names. 
He conceived his Art as a means of ascent which proceeds by way of two 
stages, a transcending of sense-knowledge by an ascent from the positive to the 
comparative degree of the dignities (bonum-melius) and a transcending of 
rational knowledge by an ascent from the comparative to the superlative degree 
(melius-optimum). 
Llull argued that sense perception cannot form a valid basis for science; it 
remains on the lowest, positive level of knowledge. Reason can, however, rise 
to the comparative level in that it attains rational knowledge of these sensible 
objects. Aristotle and Averroes attained this level. But this level is still not the 
level of true science. If the objects of the sense world are good and great, 
the objects of the rational world are better and greater. But God is with respect 
to al1 creatures the best and greatest -optimum et maximum. Only through a 
second ascent, therefore, can the intellect attain the level of eterna1 truth. 
On this superlative level the differences we had encountered on the first two 
levels disappear. Because God is the best in the superlative degree, it is no 
longer possible to distinguish him as such from the greatest or the most 
powerful. At the superlative degree of reality the mystic dia'covers the supreme 
being in whom al1 the divine names coincide or fa11 together. 
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3. Ramon Llull: Philosophe de l'action 
Two Latin mottoes characterize two divergent approaches to the medieval 
problem of the relationship between faith and science. Anselm's device, fides 
quaerens intellectum camed the day in the twelfth century. Thinkers like Hugo 
of St. Victor and Alain de Lille sought rationes necessariae for the doctrines of 
the faith. But at the beginning of the thirteenth century a new device appeared 
on the field, the motto, fides non habet meritum cui humana ratio praebet 
experinzentum, of Pope Gregory IX. Anselm's idea -which has been senously 
misinterpreted by the histonans of Christian philosophy- was formulated in 
the context of the dialogue between the three great mediterranean religions. The 
new papa1 device represented a narrowing of the European vision. It was this 
device that implied the separation of theology from philosophy. Philosophy was 
assigned the task of providing reasons for the acceptance of a body of doctrine- 
not for the doctnnes themselves. The history of this approach is well known. It 
is the history of the Christian philosophy which we have written. Anselm's 
approach did not however remain submerged. It surfaced again in different 
guises in the early fourteenth century. 
In his works Llull sought above al1 to render intelligible the Christian 
doctrine on which al1 missionary intent had foundered, the doctrine of the 
Trinity. For this purpose he had recourse to an analysis of what it means when 
we say that the powers of the divine names are active. He held that we cannot 
truly cal1 something good which does not produce a good. 
In this way Llull introduced a completely new category in the history of 
metaphysics. In accordance with his apologetic purpose he spoke not only 
of pnnciples of being, but also of principies of action. He proposed the thesis 
not only that God is productive contingenter and ad extra in creation, but also 
that the divine persons are productive necessarie and ad intra. 
Taking his point of departure from the dynamism which his Islamic partners 
in dialogue admitted, the dynamism of the process of knowledge (the knowing 
intellect, the known object, and the act of knowledge) and love (the lover, the 
beloved, and love itself), Llull maintained that we must admit the activity of al1 
the divine perfections. True goodness must produce something good; true 
greatness must produce something great. 
Because action presupposes a principle or source, that which is produced, 
and a bond between them, he spoke not only of the dignities, but also of their acts 
and the «correlatives» of their action. To designate these correlatives, he formed 
new words which appear strange in Latin and were probably formed on the 
analogy of the forms of the Arabic verb. In a sermon given in Tunis he explain: 
Actus.. . bonitatis dico bonificativum, bonificabile, bonificare; actus etiam 
magnitudinis sunt magnificativum, magnificabile, magnificare; et sic de aliis 
ornnibus divinis dignitatibus. 
Llull generalised this idea to the extent that he could speak even of the 
abstract moments of activity as -tivum, -bile and -are. He defined these 
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moments as substantial and intrinsic principles of action which are valid for al1 
reality. In this way he was able to recognise images of the triune God in al1 
aspects of the created world, in the form, matter and conjunction which make up 
corporeal things; in the form, subject and property which constitute the nature 
of the angels; and even in the three dimensions of bodies and the two premisses 
and one conclusion of the syllogism. Above al1 in the union. Syllogism -above 
al1 in the union of knower and person known in the act of mystical knowledge 
and in the union of a lover and a beloved bound together in the active love. A 
lover and a beloved bound together in true active love. 
Llull was aided in his apologetic purpose by the analysis of the knowledge 
of the illuminated mystic current among some Moslem thinkers. Certain 
Christian controversialists writing in Arabic had taken up as an analogy for the 
Trinity Aristotle's description of God as vóqots votocws, as it had been 
expanded in Neoplatonism from two to three terms. Some Moslem writers 
accepted this idea for the mystical knowledge of God in which the knower, the 
object known and the act of knowing itself are one. 
Llull was able to join this analogy with Augustine's famous comparison of the 
Trinity with human love. In his De amic e amut, a charming little book which is 
one of the great glories of the Catalan language, Llull maintained that true, active 
love presupposes a lover, the beloved, and the love itself which unites them. 
Because the correlative principles are intrinsic to al1 activity, action and 
passion are not, as in Aristotle, accidental. For Llull, being and activity both 
belong to the substance of things and are identical. 
Because activity implies relatedness, Llull added, in the later forms of the 
Art, nine relative dignities to the absolute ones listed earlier: difference, 
contrariety, concordance; greaterness, lesserness, equality; beginning, middle 
and end; «contrariety», «greaterness» and «lesserness» are encountered in the 
created world, but on the superlative leve1 of the divine activity there remain 
only «difference», «equality» and «concordante». 
The infinitely great, divine optimans can only produce the divine optimatunz 
which is its «equal»; the «difference» between them being necessarily 
transcended in the «concordante» of the divine optimare, while al1 three 
together form the «beginning», «middle» and «end» of al1 things. 
In the sermon quoted above Llull made clear the relationship of his dynamic 
understanding of reality to the chartrain triad of unitas, aequalitas arzd 
connexio. He concluded: 
Per praedictarum.. . dignitatum.. . substantiales actus intrinsecos et aeternos, 
aequaliter et concordanter acceptos . . .  probant evidenter Christiani in una 
simplicissima divina essentia et natura esse trinitatem personarum, scilicet 
Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. 
Thus for Llull the correlative unfolding of al1 things became an absolute 
ontological principle. Even the divine unity known through faith must be 
structured. As an active unity it must have a moment which is to be united. If 
God is truly one in an active sense of the word, he must be triune, even though 
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on the superlative leve1 of the divine activity the manner in which God is triune 
eludes man's understanding. 
Having thus discovered the Christian Trinity in the mediated unity of the 
most simple divine essence, Llull also sought, by means of the dynamic 
dignities of his Art, to make intelligible the doctrine, known to Christians by 
faith, of the lncarnation of Christ. To this purpose he appealed to the distinction 
between the necessary activity of the dignities ad intra, and their contingent 
activity ad extra. Whereas the divine activity ad intra is necessary, the creation 
of the world ad extra is dependent on the divine will. But when God has freely 
chosen the creation of the world, the infinite first cause can only achieve 
concord with its effect: 
In Filii Dei incarnatione, per participationem scilicet unionis creatoris et 
creaturae in una persona Christi. 
Aristotle's theory of science, which begins with self-evident principles in 
order to present a body of doctrine deductively, was well suited to the 
thirteenth-century idea of the relation between faith and reason. The articles of 
faith could be taken as the first principles for a Summa of theology. The 
Anselmian approach implied a different theory of science -a theory of a 
science which ascends beyond al1 hypotheses and principles to the one 
presuppositionless beginning of al1 knowledge and al1 reality. The opposition 
between two approaches should not be understood simply as an opposi- 
tion between Aristotelianism and Platonism. Thirteenth-century Aristotelians 
were able to fit many Neoplatonic ideas into their syntheses since they were 
easily adaptable to the idea of the theologians that Adam's fa11 darkened man's 
intellect and weakened his will. The often proclaimed great thirteenth-century 
synthesis between Platonism and Aristotelianism was in fact the result of the 
desire to show not only that revelation is in accord with reason, but also that it is 
necessary, since man's nature is a fallen nature. The approach of Anselm of 
Canterbury represented rather something completely new in the history 
of philosophy. In accordance with his idea, some fourteenth-century thinkers 
saw creation and man's place in it more optimistically. Their views implied the 
abandonment of the hierarchical division of nature into supra- and sub-lunary 
realms and saw the earth not as the lowest of a series of necessary emanations, 
but as a noble star, differing only in brilliance from the other stars of the 
heavens . 
Applying his ideas to the creation of the world, Llull strongly emphasized 
not only the dynamic character of God' s causal action, but also that of its 
effect, the created world itself. He applied the distinction between necessary 
activity ad itztra and contingent activity ad extra to the activity of creatures. To 
explain how the distinction applies to creaturely activity, he employed the 
example of a property in a subject. 
Fire, for example, must necessarily burn, but whether it heats water or 
burns wood is contingent. Within itself fire is active «substantially» and «in a 
proper way»;  in water or  earth it is active «accidentally» and «in  an 
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appropriated way». The form of whiteness is active within itself? but when it 
contingently whitens (albificut ) this or that body, it is present in the body in a 
«contracted» way. 
For Llull therefore creation is a likeness of God because of its dynamic 
character. Not only does God's activity of creation not cease with the bestowal 
of being on the world, but the world which God has treated is itself active. 
tending to its own perfection. 
Just as whiteness can seek to increment its contract perfection in an 
appropiated way, by whitening more and more individual bodies, so also the 
creator has so created the various species that they tend to increase their 
perfection by numerical multiplication. 
Although the particular, individual things of which the world is made up are 
in process tending toward perfection, no individual thing can attain the full 
perfection of its species. The species is the limit to which the perfection of the 
individual approaches, the genus that of the species, the universe that of the 
genera. 
Llull understood the individuals, species and genera which we encounter in 
the world as parts of a whole, as components of a unity reflecting the dynamic 
greatness of the creator. He presented his understanding of this whole -this 
universe- most clearly in his epoch-making Liber chaos, a work which he 
appended to the second redaction of his Art, the Ars demonstrativa. 
In this work Llull broke with the medieval idea of a Stufenkosnzos. He gives 
no account of the heavenly spheres and their angelic movers, but focused his 
attention rather on the sublunary world of the four elements. His book 
understands chaos neither as a primordial void in the sense of disorder and 
confusion nor as materia informis in the sense of the Augustinian theology of 
creation. 
For Llull chaos is rather the complex of al1 the things which were created by 
God in a unique act, together with al1 the determinations categorizing them. 
Chaos contains the semina causalia whith are the grounds for al1 things, the 
forma universalia and the materia universalis, the genera and species, the 
substantiae and accidentia. From chaos proceeds everything which is beneath 
the sphere of the moon. In the semina causalia of chaos al1 the individual 
transmutntiones, al1 the various possibilities of individual development, are 
already present. The transmutations of chaos do not affect its essence. They are 
rather various actualizations of that which is already present in chaos in 
potentia. 
In his conception of chaos Llull thus brought together a great many 
different ideas from the philosophical tradition. He divided chaos into three 
degrees. In the first degree we find the rationes semirzales of the Stoics in the 
role of a genus for both the Platonic notion of a world soul and the Anstotelian 
predicables and categories. In the second degree we find the first individuals of 
the particular species, in the third al1 the individuals deriving from these first 
ones. 
But Llull's use of these ideas completely transformed their meaning. The 
Platonic idea of an anima mundi is associated with the Anstotelian doctrine of 
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matter and form, but understood in terms of the Llullian correlatives of action. 
Chaos is made up of the four abstract essences of the four elements: igneitus, 
aeritas aqueitas, teneitas. Each essence has its proper correlatives, its proper 
form ( ignif icuti i ,um),  its proper matter ( ignif icabile)  and its proper act 
(igiiificare). 
The matter and form of the various individuals in chaos should not be 
thought of as limited to the individuals Al1 the proper forms are pined together 
in a unique foi.ma uiiiversalis -a Corpus mundi -which is the total sum of al1 
the possible (-bilia). Taken together, this universal form and this universal 
matter make up the urium esse, the uizunz suppositunz, which Llull calls chaos. 
From the universal form and universal inatter emerge the genera and 
species, substances and accidents, and from them in tum the individual things 
composed of particular forms and matters. Each particular form and each 
particular matter is grounded in the universal form and matter. In accordance 
with his doctrine of relative principies Llull understood the second degree of 
chaos as mediating between the original sei?zina causalia and the final 
perfection which the individuals find in their numerical multiplication. 
But the concrete individual things which emerge from the seniiila causalia 
tend not only to their extnnsic, numerical multiplication. They tend also to their 
intrinsic, proper perfection. By nature each concrete thing strives to fulfill the 
abstract essence from which it has emerged. It was in this sense that Llull 
maintained that the categories and predicables and the union of universal form 
and universal matter are real things. The abstract is already really present in 
individual things as the limit of their, striving toward infinity. 
In his Libel de natura, a treatise which is intimately connected with the 
final redaction of Art, Llull defined nature as the principle through which the 
entia concrcta - the individual man (horno), for example -approach ever more 
closely the entia abstracta- the essence of man (hunzmlitus). 
For this reason Llull could adopt the Neoplatonic idea of nature as the \lis 
ailimae unii~ersalis which is the tliird emanation from the One. In the Ars 
genelzlis ultima he described nature as the essentia in suo riaturuli concreto 
sLrsterltata et iliota per actuni naturaleni. Accordingly, he thought of the 
essences of things as vires, as powers which are moved by the natures in them. 
At each degree of their return to the original unity the respective -tiva form the 
i~atui.a natui.arzs, the respective -bilia the natu1.a naturata, and the respective 
-are the union of both. 
In this way chaos taken as a whole can be understood as the reflection of 
the divine nature whose dynamism unfolds in a threefold natura, a rzatura 
iiutui.ans, u natura naturata arld a nuturu naturare. 
4. From Anselm's Maxiinum to the Dignitas hominis of the Renaissance 
The two divergent conceptions of knowledge and reality which ran in parallel 
currents through the entire medieval penod came into open conflict over the 
nature of man. The conflict reached its high point in the debates conceming 
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the nature of Christ and the necessity of the Incamation. The course the conflict 
took has been obscured by the fact that Scholasticism distinguished Christian 
philosophy from theology and regarded christological questions as belonging 
exclusively to a supernatural theology. But the medieval christological debates 
did not concem simply the question of the nature of Christ. At a more profound 
level, they were at so discussions about the nature of rnan himself -about the 
maximum of which he is capable. Because the proponents of the distinction 
between Christian philosophy and theology wanted to underline the necessity of 
revelation consequent upon Adam's fall, they regarded the Incarnation of Christ 
as only contingently necessary, that is, as necessary only to repair the damage 
done to man's nature through original sin. But outside strictly Scholastic circles 
-and even in some circles generally thought to belong to Scholasticism- 
many thinkers maintained the absolute necessity of the Incarnation, seeing 
Christ as the culmination of creation and the absolute perfection to which 
human nature necessarily tends. The history of medieval philosophy can not 
ignore such attempts to conceive of rnan as the dynamic bond which strives to 
join spiritual and material reality. These attempts were made in accordance with 
an understanding of human knowledge and a conception of nature which was 
different from that of the proponents of the notion of a Christian philosophy, but 
they enable us to appreciate the continuity which exists between Anselm's idea 
of the maximum and the Renaissance conception of the dignitas hominis. 
Llull's distinction between necessary activity ad intra and contingent activi- 
ty ad extra was also crucial for his idea of man. In accordance with his concep- 
tion of the tnediate place of the incarnate Christ between the first cause and its 
effect, he defined rnan by way of his relationship both to God and to the world. 
With respect to creation, Llull held that rnan is a «microcosm>>. Although he 
was referring to the traditional motif which saw rnan as a world in miniature, he 
modified the traditional understanding of this idea radically. Man is a 
microcosm, not because he comprises in himself al1 the different degrees of 
reality and thus is subject to al1 its antagonistic forces, but rather because he 
forms the center of creation, uniting in himself the lowest level of intellectual 
reality and the highest reach of sensible being and is thus a bond which holds 
creation together. 
With respect to the creator, nlan is himself creative ad extra, bringing forth 
ideas, instruments, tools and works of art. In producing tools and works of art, 
rnan uses matenals he finds in nature, but the forms he gives them are not mere 
imitations of natural things. They are true productions of his own mind. Man' s 
creative power thus approaches that of God. But whereas God brings forth as 
real beings the things that he understands, man's mind is not able to produce 
real beings, it can only represent them and appropriate them to itself. 
The metaphysical distinction between necessary and contingent activity was 
fundamental for Llull's understanding of man, above al1 because it enabled him 
to analyze more profoundly the nature of human knowledge. He had maintained 
rhat things like fire and whiteness have their own necessary, intrinsic and proper 
correlatives of action, whereas their obiects ad extra (earth or water, this os that 
hody) are contingent, extrinsic and appropriated to them. 
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In the very important late work De potentia, obiecto et actu Llull drew the 
consequences of this idea for human knowledge. The sensible things which 
the mind encounters in the world are not necessary objects of knowledge. 
Even the instruments and tools which the mind itself produces are objects 
appropriated by the mind to itself. The proper object of the mind must be an 
interior reality. Just as the proper object of fire is not earth or water, but rather 
fire itself as ignitable, so also the proper object of the mind can only be the 
mind itself as knowable. 
To discover its true self, the mind must withdraw from the othemess and 
contingency which is involved in sense perception and rational knowledge. The 
mind must tum inward. It must tum away from its contingent activity ad extra 
and ascend to its own necessary, intrinsic dynamism. 
The condition of the mind's return to itself is a deliberate, prior choice. 
Man' S ultimate autonomy is grounded not only in his faculties of knowledge, 
but also in his abiIity freely to choose. Through his faculties of knowledge rnan 
can comprehend al1 things; through his freedom he can become al1 things. He 
has the ability to choose to belong to himself, to free himself from the world 
and realize al1 the interior potentialities of his nature. 
In thus reflecting on himself, rnan becomes a proper object of knowledge 
for himself. Since the knowledge of an object presupposes a disposition in the 
object enabling it to be known, rnan thus discovers himself as knowable. To 
explain that necessary process of human knowledge ad intra, Llull tumed to his 
theory of the correlatives of action: the knower (intelligens) knows himself as 
knowable object (intelligibile) in the activity of knowing (intelligere). This 
triadic structure does not imply a splitting up of rnan into three separate entities. 
Man knows himself as knowable, but relates this knowable object to himself. 
At the same time, rnan becomes conscious of his own finitude. His 
knowledge is limited not only because it has to have recourse to sensible 
images. In order to understand the things which the mind discovers in the world 
-things which are in constant process, tending to their own perfection- it 
must reduce them to the static categories of discursive reason. Even its 
knowledge of those things brought forth by its own creativity is restricted 
because its ideas can only be realized in an alien matter. 
Above all, however, it is in his effort to discover himself that rnan is, 
-confronted with the limitations of his nature. Although he must free himself 
from exterior things to find himself, the nature of his mind compels him to go 
out to exterior things before he can begin to return inwardly to himself. 
From this vantage-point it is easy to appreciate the originality of Llull's 
Logica nova, a work which belongs to the period of the Ars generalis ultima. 
The logic of this work is new because it is meant to be a logic of pure knowing, 
a logic whose first intention is to consider the intellectual things which are the 
proper object of the intellect. It is only in a second intention that the new logic 
must consider the appropriated objects of the intellect, the ideas which the 
intellect abstracts from sensible things. 
Reflecting Llull's idea of an intellectual ascent, the second figure of the Ars 
generalis ultinza distinguishes three degrees of knowledge: sensible knowledge 
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of sensible things, intellectual knowledge of sensible things, and intellectual 
knowledge of intellectual things. Since the Logica nova was conceived as a 
logic for the third degree of knowledge, the intellectual knowledge of 
intellectual things, it is at the same time a critique of the traditional logic and 
the theory of knowledge on which it was based. For Llull, Aristotle's logic was 
deficient because it limited itself to the intellectual knowledge of sensible 
things. 
It is true that in the twelfth century certain thinkers recognized the 
possibility of a logic for the intellectual knowledge of intellectual things. 
Following Boethius, they distinguished between «itztelligibiliu», that is, the 
objects of the second degree of knowledge, and «intellectibilia», those of 
the third degree. But the thirteenth-century reception of Aristotle focused 
attention on the formulation of a logic of the second degree of knowledge, the 
intellectual knowledge of sensible things, and precluded an attempt to analyze 
the conditions of its possibility. 
This is the reason why Llull's prologue to the Logica novu speaks of the 
unstable character of the traditional logic and proposes to reconstruct it on a 
new foundation, that of the third degree of knowledge. Because it concerns 
intellectual knowledge of intellectual things, Llull spoke of this highest degree 
of knowledge as a «natural» manner of knowing. Making use of his distinction 
between the necessary and the contingent correlatives of action, he regarded 
intellectual things as the necessary, intrinsic, proper objects of knowledge and 
criticized the traditional logic as one which treats only «peregrine» knowledge; 
the knowledge of contingent, extrinsic, appropriated objects, the sensible things 
encountered in this world. 
Man's true nature is spiritual and tumed to intellectible things. But he must 
go out to corporeal reality and appropriate to himself sensible things in order to 
be able to retum to his proper self. Corporeal things -the subjects of the Art, 
imaginativa, sensitiva, vegetativa, elementativa- are al1 only instruments for 
man's realization of reason in the world. This is the reason why the Logica nova 
situates man on the border-line between spiritual and corporeal reality. 
Man's proper function -as homificans animal in the enigmatic definition 
of the Logica nova- is the hominization of the animal, vegetable, and 
elemental kingdoms, and through them of the whole univers. Man is man not 
only because he seeks to approach ever more closely his abstract essence as 
animal rationale, but also because he seeks the complete transformation of his 
genus. The individual strives upward to the species, the species to the genus, 
and the genus to the original cosmic unity which is made up of universal form 
and universal matter. 
Man is a microcosm, a bond joining spiritual and corporeal reality, because 
the tivum of his rational nature is able to appropriate to itself the various 
subjects which make up the universe. But the condition of the possibility of this 
appropriated knowledge lies in the proper, third degree of knowledge for which 
the Logica nova is meant. 
In his reflection on himself, man thus achieves a new modesty, a modesty 
which gives birth to the realization that there must exist-beyond his own 
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contracted -bile an absolute -tivum which is not only the origin and source, but 
also the end and perfection of al1 things. There is no comparison possible 
between the divine -tivum and the human -bile. But because God himself is the 
condition of the encounter between himself and man his transcendence is not 
infringed upon by being taken up in the process of human knowledge. The 
triadic structure of the necessary, intrinsic mode of understanding permits union 
without identification. 
God is knowable. not as are the exterior things which are the contingent 
objects of human knowledge. He is the complementary part of the process of 
knowledge which takes place in the meeting of two subjects, each of whom 
experiences himself as knower and known, while both are united in the activity 
of knowing. Because God is himself intellect -intelligens intelligibile, 
irztelligel-e- the created intellect can attain union with him and beatitude. 
The condition of this union is that man be in complete possession of 
himself. He must freely respond to God's knowability. Through his free choice 
of himself, man is able, to transcend sense impressions and rational concepts 
and attain the superlative One in whom al1 perfections fa11 together. 
Man realizes himself, al1 the interior potentialities of his nature, in this 
union. The triadic structure of his knowledge makes him an image of God. In 
his encounter with the exemplar -a transcendent exemplar which is the 
beginning, middle, and end of his striving- man arrives at the ciynamic repose 
which is the activity of knowing. The measure of his own truth is the degree of 
intensity with which he reflects the divine exemplar. The gulf which separates 
exemplar and image, God and man, could only be bridged if God himself 
assumed human nature and elevated it to a maximum perfection. 
Llull 's conception of Christ as the God-man gives us the key to his 
understanding of the created world. In the incarnate Christ his conception of the 
universe reaches its culmination. The full perfection of the universe demands the 
union of creator and creature. This does not imply that Christ is a mediate na- 
ture between divinity and humanity, but rather that in his person the divine 
nature and the created nature of the universe are brought together. 
Christ is the bond joining God and the world, because as an individual he is 
the fulfillment of al1 the interior potentialities of the species and through him the 
human species is the fulfillment of the universe. In his human nature he is 
the supreme limit of the active striving of al1 nature to its perfection and in his 
divine nature he is the perfect image of the Father. 
